

of the public polled favored taking the Lend-Lease step. Nevertheless, by the close of March, 1941, Congress voted a huge \$7 billion appropriation.

Lend-Lease reversed the whole business of cash-and-carry aid. It was a remarkable way of providing aid at a pace never attempted before. America began marshaling her producing skills for war and aid in support of the allied nations in their struggle. Lend-Lease of 1941 provided U.S. government-built ships, tanks, aircraft, guns, etc. at our own expense—yes, at our own expense—primary essential materials for nations whose defense was considered vital. Agreements were eventually signed by Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, Belgium, Norway, Poland, Denmark, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Brazil, the Netherlands, and Liberia. Repayment was made in goods, property, and reverse-lend-lease. This was its uniqueness; no steps were taken to follow the pattern of WWI. In a short 5 years, the total of Lend-Lease aid extended to nations in peril was \$50 billion; in 1941, seventy-five percent of military contracts were managed by 56 large corporations.

Exchanges, exchanges. The era of early 1941 has a sub-theme amidst the encroaching clouds of war and turmoil of death, it is an era of exchanges and secretive intercepts. We now should profile what was occurring on the other side of the world and hop-scotch to the Pacific, momentarily. We enter the world of profound espionage. By 1941, the American cryptographers known as cryppies, had broken and were using the code systems of the Japanese: Black and Purple Codes. The ladder was the diplomatic code, while the former was divided into 29 separate codes.

The Japanese were deadly serious and weren't kidding. [The earliest war interceptions that President Roosevelt ever read revolves around messages discovered in about 20 boxes

of records released on January 23, 1995. One box contains messages from October 25, 1940, called the Kobayashi mission. FDR learned the Japanese were going to infiltrate Java and planned to send a series of specialist experts to Batavia Harbor (now called Djakarta) and to lease a land area specifically for their use. A short time later, from the intercepts, FDR was able to urge the Dutch government not to lease the land and passed on to them the reason for his thinking, namely the newly discovered intercepts—the earliest intelligence reports which went to FDR apparently are dated as early as February 23, 1940, which confirmed that the Japanese were in the process of sending advisors to Bolivia in the hope of attaining tin, a vital war material, and they were also seeking oil export rights in Portuguese Timor.]

Japan's most strategic war strategies and secrets were sent to their overseas emissaries and agents via what is now known as the 5-Num system, a super secret branch of Japan's Imperial Navy code.

Historians in the past suggest the United States could not break the Imperial Navy's codes until 1942 at the time of Midway, with only the Flag Officers' Code the only code never broken in the entire world war.

Cryptographic science is an entirely new ballgame, involving less muscle and more brains to knock out an opponent—after all, in 1917 the Germans knocked out Russia out of the war by breaking their code, anticipating the whole campaign, and badly defeating a stronger opponent, if not the strongest.

The United States and her Allies possessed 25 prewar Pacific Rim eavesdropping stations. Each used different monitoring systems. American participants used a network of radio receivers, there were no such things as satellites, to monitor Japanese operations. It was a monumental traffic effort. The area of monitoring ran from the east coast of China to Batavia on the island of Java, some 3,000 miles, in the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) across miles of blue ocean to Hawaii up to Dutch Harbor to Alaska and down all the way

to California, ending over 6,500 miles from China to Imperial Beach, California, codenamed ITEM, and which had a primary duty to monitor Japanese fleet units approaching Hawaii or the West Coast.

Even though America was neutral, surveillance was primarily a U.S. show. The British had four WT stations (WT short for wireless-telegraph); 1 in Hong Kong, 1 in Singapore and 2 in Canada. Holland had one in the Indies.

The U.S. possessed four prewar intelligence command posts, or decoding centers, along the Pacific. Each used, to varying degrees, different decoding systems. These included a spark-spitting, handmade decoding machine called, The Purple Machine. Imperial Japan's Foreign Ministry, for example, used four diplomatic codes for contacting overseas missions during 1941; Purple was one, and is probably the most sensitive. [The other three were LA, the J series, and Otei, also known as PA and a main method of communication between secret Japanese operators in Honolulu and Tokyo. Via couriers, the operative code systems were distributed in secret code books worldwide. You never knew how it would work out. Once, a Japanese courier was paid \$40,000 for secret codes. On April 24, 1941, working on a tip that a courier would arrive at the fair city of San Francisco, U.S. Navy agents posing as customs agents secretly opened the boxes on the dock with the code books and quietly photographed them.] Every day, the secret alphabetic sequence which determined the order of the letters would change. According to Commander Lawrence Safford from November 29 to December 7, Washington D.C. Station US was so good, it was able to supply the operations of a Purple Machine on Corregidor with daily Purple sequences.

One center was called HYPO and was led by Lieut. Commander Joseph Rochefort and Lieut. Commander Thomas Dyer, who in the late 1930s had helped decode the Black Code [see box] with Mrs. Agnes Meyer Driscoll, Madame X.

The next code-breaking center was Station H, led by Capt.

Homer Kisner, also stationed on the Hawaiian island of Oahu. Since both were stationed in Hawaii, were designated the peculiar phonetic designation HYPO, or H for Hawaii.

The third decoding center was designated CAST, which was in the Philippines near Manila. I shall occasionally call it C. Many historians think C was located at Cavite; others the rock island of Corregidor. In reality, it was situated at Cavite then, in a tunnel on Corregidor Island from September 1941 onwards, some thirty miles west of Manila.

The fourth is Station SAIL, 6,638 miles from Manila, which hardly anybody ever hears of. It was located near Seattle, Washington. SAIL intercepted all naval and diplomatic text of Japan, and dispatched its information by teleprinter due to the facility of being in the States. In addition to SAIL and ITEM, the Navy had 4 radio intercept stations that monitored RDF signals. The Army intercepted diplomatic messages from the America's by way of two intercept outposts: one in the Panama Canal Zone and the other in San Francisco. By means of RDF signals, one was able to ascertain the geographic positions. Unfortunately, solar storms can disrupt radio broadcasts; as was the case in late November of 1941. With the exception of Panama, San Francisco, and CAST, which was run jointly by the army and navy, it was mainly a U.S. Navy show. For the record, joining them were the ultra-super secret Station V, which were a group of sailors at Vaitogi, Pago Pago, who manned RDF signals, but all their records remain under lock and key.

NEGAT from the capital, Washington D.C., was the control center for everybody, located on 18th St and Constitution Ave, N.W., dubbed N for Navy or Nebraska depending on who you talk to. NEGAT was initially called the Communications Security Group, headed by Agnes Driscoll of Station US, housed at 3801 Nebraska Ave, NW, formerly the Mount Vernon Seminary before WW II. Control center for the Army was a few blocks away on 20th St., also on Constitution, at the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) in Army Headquarters—now occu-

plied by the Vietnam memorial. This was before the Pentagon.

NEGAT and CAST were not only interceptors and decoders, they had the job to decipher. In other words if a facility had decoded something ie. grabbed a message it did not mean they could make head or tails out of it, that was the job of the people who could decipher. They all had their hands full.

Back in October of 1940, America's cryppies got two breaks. Army specialists under Col. William Friedman of SIS solved Purple machine problems that led to the development of constructing a prototype that worked 100%, as long as you kept up with the codes. The Navy used the blueprints of the prototype to build four new babies. It must be pointed out Purple was new, because it was what replaced what used to be called the Red Code, Red was hot in the 1930s but now out, Purple was in. A forerunner to JN-25 was the other break, 5-Num which the U.S. Navy also solved in October. It was formerly called the Black Code.

The new breaks gave the U.S. the ability to read radio call signs issued to individual officers and warships and Marus (freighters) of Japan AND to read Code Book 5 (primarily a Marus code, known to the participants as Shin Code) AND the ability to also monitor code issued to all ships which told about arrivals, departures and destinations known as the movement code or SM code. WHEW! That is a lot.

It was not easy. For example, in Spring of 1941, the U.S. Army had a radio station also on Hawaii called Station Five that frequently intercepted Purple codes, but without a Purple machine to decode, anything that was caught had to be forwarded to N; which grew to about 300 men and women in 1941.

The secret nature of information involves an astounding discovery that, unbelievable as it may sound, comes to our public eye some 60 years after the great tension of 1941. To begin with, it starts exactly 58 years after 1941, with the manuscript Day of Deceit by Robert B. Stinnett. It was published at the end of 1999. As anyone in the publishing field

The breaking of the 5-Num code belongs to the secret code-breaking team of Agnes M. Driscoll, a math whiz from Ohio State University. Obscure and known as Madame X or Miss Aggie, as early as October 1940, she and her team had deciphered 5-Num. For most of the last century no one except in select circles knew about this super-secret branch of the Navy had broke it. To this day, actual documents concerning the 5-Num code remain classified.

knows, if your manuscript is published near December, publishers print the following year as copyright, in this case 2000.

In his book, we are presented with the sub-theme that both army and navy cryptologists were not only involved in trying to decipher the audacious 5-Num, but, he shows proof that bits were decoded throughout 1941, before December 7, including some vital parts that apparently point to Pearl as the target. We will get to that later in this book.

He was able to get his hands on previously classified documents during the climax of his research in 1995-1999. Before 1995, in a nutshell, virtually all public records available stated no 5-Num codes were deciphered and read prior to December 7. For the purpose of this chapter, one secret note sticks in my mind. It is a note, a secret dispatch sent by Admiral Thomas Hart, commander of all Far East Pacific Fleets in the Philippines to Admiral Harold R. Stark, FDR's Chief of Naval Operations. It was dated March 5, 1941. This note dispatch is located in the Station US papers, RG38, MMRB, Archives II as a historical document is reproduced in his book for the time. It had been sequestered these many decades and apparently unnoticed even by the congressional investigations of 1945-46 and 1995. Stinnett was able to get his hands on documents that other historians have failed and for that I commend him.

Experts solving 5-Num code were not apparently in the dark prior to December 7th.

It so happens during March and April of 1941, three Americans after preparing to leave Washington D.C. headed overseas. They were specialists in Japanese naval codes, Lieut. John Lietwiler was going to the Philippines. Lieut. Robert Weeks was assigned to the Atlantic Fleet on the USS **Augusta**. And, Ensign Prescott Currier was ordered to go to Hawaii; incidentally, back in February, Currier had been part of an escort and instruction party that had secretly delivered a super-secret Purple machine to London.

On March 25-26, 1941, depending on which side of the

dateline you were on, another Purple machine arrived in Manila, as secret-cargo, Class A. It had initially left San Pedro, California, on January 26, and this was a real slow-boat-to-China deal, on board the USS **Sepulga**. This takes us back to the Manila dispatch of March of Admiral Hart. From the dispatch, one learns four key things.

1. The British had the capacity to read both Purple and 5-Num as of mid-March, 1941. [The former via Singapore who had one Purple machine, the latter by way of Admiral Hart's confirmation super secret dispatch.

2. Prior to the uncovering of this dispatch, historians worldwide debated if Japanese dispatches sent via the radio waves as 5-Num, the forerunner to JN-25, were ever deciphered before or only during June in the war year of 1942.

3. Dispatch was written before the **Sepulga** arrived in Manila with Ensign MacKallor and notes that this special dispatch should not be used as reference, but instead a "dummy" should be in place at the Navy files.

4. Historian Stinnett uncovers letter, hidden from prior investigations, which denotes in clear black-and-white a reference that the British (three officers and 20 clerks) are deciphering 5-Num and are also awaiting further code "book exchanges" ie. the latest 5-Num solutions. This confirms the U.S. Navy's decoding success to break "the unbreakable" prior to 1942. Extraordinary security procedures was the name of the game in 1941.

[The next few pages contains a speech that was given by Roosevelt on May 27, 1941. This was 7 days after German paratroops had landed on the island of Crete and just 5 days after a British fleet was soundly whipped off the coast of Greece, in the Kithera Channel. It directly addresses the account of the seriousness of war. The importance of the