

Commander Joseph Rochefort and Lieut. Commander Thomas Dyer, who in the late 1930's had helped decode the Black Code [see box next page] with Mrs. Agnes Meyer Driscoll, Madame X.

The next code-breaking center was Station H, led by Capt. Homer Kisner, also stationed on the Hawaiian island of Oahu. Since both were stationed in Hawaii, were designated the peculiar phonetic designation HYPO, or H for Hawaii.

The third decoding center was designated CAST, which was in the Philippines near Manila. I shall occasionally call it C. Many historians think C was located at Cavite; others the rock island of Corregidor. In reality, it was situated at Cavite then, in a tunnel on Corregidor Island from September 1941 onwards, some thirty miles west of Manila.

The fourth is Station SAIL, 6,638 miles from Manila, which hardly anybody ever hears of. It was located near Seattle, Washington. SAIL intercepted all naval and diplomatic text of Japan, and dispatched its information by teleprinter due to the facility of being in the States. In addition to SAIL and ITEM, the Navy had 4 radio intercept stations that monitored RDF signals. The Army intercepted diplomatic messages from the America's by way of two intercept outposts: one in the Panama Canal Zone and the other in San Francisco. By means of RDF signals, one was able to ascertain the geographic positions. Unfortunately, solar storms can disrupt radio broadcasts; as was the case in late November of 1941. With the exception of Panama, San Francisco, and CAST, which was run jointly by the army and navy, it was mainly a U.S. Navy show. For the record, joining them were the ultra-super secret Station V, which were a group of sailors at Vaitogi, Pago Pago, who manned RDF signals, but all their records remain under lock and key.

NEGAT from the capital, Washington D.C., was the

The breaking of the 5-Num code belongs to the secret code-breaking team of Agnes M. Driscoll, a math wiz from Ohio State University. Obscure and known as Madame X or Miss Aggie, as early as October 1940, she and her team had deciphered 5-Num. For most of the last century no one except in select circles knew about this super-secret branch of the Navy who broke it. To this day, actual documents concerning the 5-Num code remain classified.

control center for everybody, located on 18th St. and Constitution Ave, N.W., dubbed N for Navy or Nebraska depending on who you talk to. NEGAT was initially called the Communications Security Group, headed by Agnes Driscoll of Station US, housed at 3801 Nebraska Ave, NW, formerly the Mount Vernon Seminary before WW II. Control center for the Army was a few blocks away on 20th St., also on Constitution, at the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) in Army Headquarters—now occupied by the Vietnam memorial. This was before the Pentagon.

NEGAT and CAST were not only intercepters and decoders, they had the job to decipher. In other words if a facility had decoded something ie. grabbed a message it did not mean they could make head or tails out of it, that was the job of the people who could decipher. They all had their hands full.

Back in October of 1940, America's crypties got two breaks. Army specialists under Col. William Friedman of SIS solved Purple machine problems that led to the development of constructing a prototype that worked 100%, as long as you kept up with the codes. The Navy used the blueprints of the prototype to build four new babies. It must be pointed out Purple was new, because it was what replaced what used to be called the Red Code, Red was hot in the 1930's but now out, Purple was in. A forerunner to JN-25 was the other break, 5-Num which the U.S. Navy also solved in October. It was formerly called the Black Code.

The new breaks gave the U.S. the ability to read radio call signs issued to individual officers and warships and Marus (freighters) of Japan AND to read Code Book 5 (primarily a Marus code, known to the participants as Shin Code) AND the ability to also monitor code issued to all ships which told about arrivals, departures and destinations known as the movement code or SM code. WHEW! That is a lot.

It was not easy. For example, in Spring of 1941, the U.S. Army had a radio station also on Hawaii called Station Five that frequently intercepted Purple codes, but without a Purple machine to decode, anything that was caught had to be forwarded to N; which grew to about 300 men and women in 1941.

The secret nature of information involves an astounding discovery that, unbelievable as it may sound, comes to our public eye some 60 years after the great tension of 1941. To begin with, it starts exactly 58 years after 1941, with the manuscript *Day of Deceit* by Robert B. Stinnett. It was published at the end of 1999. As anyone in the publishing field knows, if your manuscript is published near December, publishers print the following year as copyright, in this case 2000.

In his book, we are presented with the sub-theme that both army and navy cryptologists were not only involved in trying to decipher the audacious 5-Num, but, he shows proof that bits were decoded throughout 1941, before December 7, including some vital parts that apparently point to Pearl as the target. We will get to that later in this book.

He was able to get his hands on previously classified documents during the climax of his research in 1995-1999. Before 1995, in a nutshell, virtually all public records available stated no 5-Num codes were deciphered and read prior to December 7. For the purpose of this chapter, one secret note sticks in my mind. It is a note, a secret dispatch sent by Admiral Thomas Hart, commander of all Far East Pacific Fleets in the Philippines to Admiral Harold R. Stark, F.D.R.'s Chief of Naval Operations. It was dated March 5, 1941. This note dispatch is located in the Station US papers, RG38, MMRB,

## MARCH-MAY 1941

Archives II as a historical document and is reproduced in Stinnett's book for the first time in any book. It had been sequestered these many decades and apparently unnoticed even by the congressional investigations of 1945-46 and 1995. Stinnett was able to get his hands on documents that other historians have failed and for that I commend him.

Experts solving 5-Num code were not apparently in the dark prior to December 7th.

It so happens during March and April of 1941, three Americans after preparing to leave Washington D.C. headed overseas. They were specialists in Japanese naval codes, Lieut. John Lietwiler was going to the Philippines. Lieut. Robert Weeks was assigned to the Atlantic Fleet on the USS **Augusta**. And, Ensign Prescott Currier was ordered to go to Hawaii; incidentally, back in February, Currier had been part of an escort and instruction party that had secretly delivered a super-secret Purple machine to London.

On March 25-26, 1941, depending on which side of the dateline you were on, another Purple machine arrived in Manila, as secret-cargo, Class A. It had initially left San Pedro, California, on January 26, and this was a real slow-boat-to-China deal, on board the USS **Sepulga**. This takes us back to the Manila dispatch of March of Admiral Hart. From the dispatch, one learns four key things.

1. The British had the capacity to read both Purple and 5-Num as of mid-March, 1941. [The former via Singapore who had one Purple machine, the latter by way of Admiral Hart's confirmation super secret dispatch.]

2. Prior to the uncovering of this dispatch, historians worldwide debated if Japanese dispatches sent via the radio waves as 5-Num, the forerunner to JN-25, had ever



been deciphered prior to, or only during June in, the war year of 1942.

3. Dispatch was written before the ***Sepulga*** arrived in Manila with Ensign MacKallor and notes that this special dispatch should not be used as reference, but instead a "dummy" should be in place at the Navy files.

4. Historian Stinnett uncovers letter, hidden from prior investigations, which denotes in clear black-and-white a reference that the British (three officers and 20 clerks) are deciphering 5-Num and are also awaiting further code "book exchanges" ie. the latest 5-Num solutions. This confirms the U.S. Navy's decoding success to break "the unbreakable" prior to 1942. Extraordinary security procedures was the name of the game in 1941.

[The next few pages contains a speech that was given by Roosevelt on May 27, 1941. This was 7 days after German paratroops had landed on the island of Crete and just 5 days after a British fleet was soundly whipped off the coast of Greece, in the Kithera Channel. It directly addresses the account of the seriousness of war. The importance of the speech rests on its historic rundown of the U.S. and its growing power and ability in world affairs. Imagine yourself hearing the voice of Roosevelt in his fire-side chat as you read the speech.] In the shadow of famous news like Lend-Lease comes a forgotten treaty-deal with the government of Greenland.

Most people do not realize that 18,200 civilians were inhabiting Greenland in 1941, were out of contact with the world, knew little about the occupation of Denmark, and had no defense against anybody other than a few guns and harpoons. Shortly after the conquest of



relation to neutrality, they were strong enough to alter a course in history.

A ring of spying is what I am talking about.

The most notorious ring of spying was attached to the German *Abwer*. Its heyday of operations of the nineteen thirties was gone, but it was still very much alive in 1940. The *Abwehr* was the secret service branch of the German Navy, led by W. Canaris; divided into espionage, sabotage, and counterespionage sections. Hitler and the German High Command confidently depended on Canaris' espionage, sabotage and counterintelligence rings. Fortunately, there was a reason the rings were not as strong as in the thirties, and it was that the easy line of communication by the Atlantic was gone. All *Abwehr* affairs diminished after the invasion of Poland, in particular, after the sweeping from the seas of the trans-Atlantic German-registered ocean-liners. The oceanliners had served as a beautiful courier-system.

When war commenced, German agents remained on the American East Coast. Their criminal activities went unsuspected, and each agent acted as an ordinary looking person in regular civilian clothes, but worked to procure information in varied fields of economics and ammunitions. Within this "sleeping condition" if you could call it that, they, like many Americans, mirrored the times and shifted into new factories amidst the atmosphere of defense.

As far as it is known, there were no AXIS 5th Columns on the West Coast; however, Hawaii was another matter,

Pedro Aguilar Despart of Los Angeles, California, held natural draft lotto #158. All across the country, Americans were drafted by the numbers. Despart was the first Angelino drafted in WW II, Oct. 29, 1940.